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and Levinas are, we are told, 'arguably the two greatest biblical or religious 
philosophers of the last two centuries' (4). Although his own introduction is 
very good and serves its general function, students will probably come to say 
that each reading would have benefited from its own structured introduction 
just prior to the text. So, too, will students search in vain for study questions 
and guidance. In an age when the publisher is mostly king, it is unfair to 
criticise reader-volumes for omissions; nonetheless, many would disagree 
with choices which have been included. However, Caputo's collection serves 
its purpose in allowing readers to engage with this particular philosophical 
tradition. Many undergraduates may well struggle with aspects of it alone, 
but it should make a stimulating text for any seminar. 
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This volume is a wide-ranging yet subtle treatment of central issues in 
axiology. In particular, Carson focuses on the nature of the good-life, and the 
nature of non-instrumental goods. Carson provides detailed and insightful 
analyses of the positions of both key historical figures and contemporary 
figures on these issues, in addition to presenting an innovative position of 
his own, a 'divine preference theory of value'. 
Carson begins with two chapters devoted to the hedonistic theory of value, 
roughly the view that the only non-instrumental goods and bads are pleas-
ures and pains. In the first chapter he carefully analyses (and finds 0awed) 
several arguments from Mill and Sidgwick intended to defend the theory. In 
the second chapter be turns to common objections made to the theory, and 
draws attention to the fact that many of these arguments are driven by highly 
controversial intuitions. He concludes by noting that even so, the simple fact 
that many well-informed people have preferences that run contrary to the 
hedonistic theory will require explanation by the theory's proponents, and 
this will require appeal to some sort of normative or axiological realism. In 
a later chapter Carson argues that we lack adequate grounds for embracing 
any such realism. 
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Carson next considers desire or preference-satisfaction theories of value. 
He is sensitive to a number of subtle important distinctions that a1ise in 
considering various forms of such theories (for example, summative versus 
global desire-satisfaction, ideal versus actual desires, and so on). Carson 
concludes by tentatively endorsing a global version of the rational de-
sire/preference satisfaction theory as a criterion of non-instrumental value 
(94). 
In chapters 4 and 5 Carson turns to the theories of value and the good life 
held by Nietzsche, Aristotle, and more recent perfectionists. Broadly, Carson 
concludes that the accounts given by these philosophers tend to be inade-
quately explained, and that we are not given adequate reason to follow these 
theories compared to plausible versions of the rational preference satisfac-
tion theory of value. On the other hand, Carson believes that certain aspects 
of the accounts of the good life given by these authors are appealing, and that 
our rational preferences for our lives should be shaped by our vivid awareness 
of what it would be like to lead the proposed types of lives. 
The following chapters are devoted to metaethical issues. Carson provides 
a careful discussion of the concept of 'good', and proposes (roughly) that a 
necessary condition for something's being good is that it be correct (rational) 
to prefer that it exist. He also provides an insightful discussion of prominent 
contemporary forms of moral realism. Among other points, Carson argues 
that Cornell realism has yet to be developed with sufficient detail to allow 
for a complete evaluation; and at this point we lack any compelling reason 
to embrace such realism absent such development. With respect to British 
realism, Carson argues that its proponents have not yet adequately ex-
plained how to distinguish between correct and incorrect moral perception. 
Carson's arguments in these chapters mark a strong contribution to contem-
porary debates, particularly with respect to moral realism. 
Carson develops his alternative position in the final chapter, the longest 
of the book. He begins by discussing certain problems that arise for full-in-
formation accounts of rational preferences. This discussion is clear, ifrather 
brief relative to the extended discussions of Mill, Nietzsche, and moral 
realism. (Relatedly, Carson discusses such authors as Darwall, Gibbard, and 
Korsgaard only very briefly. More discussion of such prominent contempo-
rary non-realists would have been a welcome addition.) 
Putting aside certain qualifications, Carson's divine-preference theory 
holds that if there is an omniscient God who created the universe for certain 
purposes, who cares about human beings, and is kind, sympathetic, and 
unselfish, then it is correct / rational for a given person to have a certain 
preference if and only if God prefers that this person have this preference 
(250). We thus have a standard for the rationality of our preferences. On the 
other hand, if such a God does not exist, Carson argues that we need to appeal 
to another standard for the rationality or correctness of preferences. Very 
roughly, Carson holds that under such circumstances, if all possible ideal 
observers would prefer that a given person have a certain preference, then 
it is correct for this person to have this preference. If not all such observers 
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would agree, then a person's preference for X will be correct insofar as she 
would prefer X if she were to be in an empirically possible epistemic perspec-
tive (for her) concerning that preference such that there is no superior 
empirically possible perspective (for her) in which she would prefer not-X 
(256). Carson ably demonstrates how this divine-preference theory avoids 
certain problems that affiict related divine command and ideal observer 
theories. 
Still, certain questions can be raised for Carson's account; here we can 
focus on just one issue. Carson attempts to ground all value standards in 
divine preferences. But consider his qualifications that the God involved 
must be caring, sympathetic, and kind. Carson attempts to give purely 
desc1iptive accounts of these traits (thus avoiding charges that these terms, 
and the corresponding characterization of an appropriate God, are norma-
tively-loaded). But if Carson has succeeded in giving purely descriptive 
accounts of these traits, we must ask why these qualifications arise. Why not 
instead appeal to the judgements of a cruel God (where cruelty is given a 
similar descriptive characterization)? We seem to be making prior value 
judgements here (particularly that suffering is bad and that pleasure or 
happiness is good) - if not, how are we to explain the restrictions and 
qualifications concerning the nature of the God whose preferences are to set 
axiological standards? 
Value and the Good Life is a very rich work, one that makes significant 
contributions to several contemporary debates, while also providing insights 
into the work of key histo1ical figures; it is impossible to fully convey the 
range and depth of argument in a short review. Further, Carson's divine-
preference theory of value is promising and should gain significant attention 
from a wide range of philosophers. Highly recommended. 
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